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RECENT DECISIONS

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-VENUE-EFFECT OF

1948

JUDICIAL

CODE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE RESIDENCE ON VENUE UNDER THE JONES

Acr-Plaintiff seaman, having been injured while serving on a vessel owned
and operated by the defendant corporations, brought a civil action in
federal district court alleging claims for negligence under the Jones Act,1 for

1 "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may,
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury ••.•
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
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unseaworthiness, and for maintenance and cure. The venue provision of the
Jones Act2 requires that actions under it be brought in the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.8
Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania
although defendants were incorporated and maintained their principal
offices in Louisiana. Defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue were granted by the trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed.
While in the 1948 revision of the Federal Judicial Code the definition of
corporate residence for venue purposes was expanded to include any district
in which a corporation is "doing business,'' 4 this definition is not applicable
when determining where a corporate employer resides within the meaning
of the venue provision of the Jones Act. 5 Leith v. Oil Transp. Co., 321 F.2d
591 (3d Cir. 1963).6
The purpose of the federal venue requirements is to limit the place in
which an action may be brought to one which is convenient for the parties
and the witnesses. 7 In 1887 Congress restricted venue to the district of
defendant's residence, except in diversity cases, where venue lay in the
district of plantiff's residence as well. 8 Under this statute the residence of a
corporation for venue purposes was held to be only in the state of incorporation;9 and, where the state of incorporation was divided into two or more
employer resides or in which his principal office is located." Merchant Marine Act of
1920 Gones Act) § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
2 It has long been settled that the word "jurisdiction" in the final sentence of § 33 of
the Jones Act means "venue." Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
3 The venue provision of the Jones Act is controlling when a combined negligence
and unseaworthiness claim is filed as a civil action. Brown v. C.D. Mallory &: Co., 122 F.2d
98 (3d Cir. 1941). The claim for maintenance and cure does not depend upon the Jones
Act. However, the principles of pendent jurisdiction allow it to be pleaded and adjudicated
with a related Jones Act claim in a civil action. Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959) (dictum). This presupposes that the forum is
the proper one for the civil claim, and if the court finds that it does not have power to
adjudicate the principal claim, the incidental power to hear the admiralty claim is also
lacking. Principal case at 593.
4 "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 28 U.S.C. § 139I(c) (1958).
5 All other courts which have considered this question have reached the opposite
conclusion. Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 657 n.2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 902 (1959); Hutchison v. Pacific-At!. S.S. Co., 217 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1954); Garland
v. Alaska S.S. Co., 194 F. Supp. 792 (D. Alaska 1961); Franklin v. Tomlinson Fleet Corp.,
158 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Phillips v. Pope &: Talbot, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Mincy v. Detroit &: Cleveland Nav. Co., 94 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Nesct v.
Christensen, 92 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Bounds v. Streckfus Steamers, Inc., 89 F. Supp.
242 (D. Del. 1950); Bagner v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 84 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949)
(overruled in principal case by implication).
6 The court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint so as to
transform it into a libel in admiralty. Plaintiff was permitted within thirty days to move
for a vacation of the order dismissing the complaint and a transfer of the action to a
district of proper venue. Principal case at 594-95.
7 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
s Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § I, 24 Stat. 552.
9 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 453 (1892).
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districts, then in the district where its official residence was designated by its
charter or by state law, and, in the absence of such a designation, then in
the district of its home office. 10 With the rise of the modem corporation
engaged in multifarious activities throughout the nation came a concomitant rise in the number of injuries resulting from such activities. The
limitation of venue in a suit involving a corporate defendant to the state
of incorporation unless the plaintiff was able to maintain a diversity action
in his own state was more than merely inconvenient to the injured party;
in practical effect, it frequently constituted an immunity from suit in
other states of the corporation's activity.11 In 1935 the situation was
alleviated somewhat by the Supreme Court's decision in Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. 12 that a corporate defendant in a diversity
case waives its venue privilege in the federal courts by securing a license to
do business and appointing an agent for service of process in compliance
with state regulations.1 3 However, this was not a complete solution, for
many questions relating to the applicability of the rule remained unanswered.14 It was in such circumstances that section 139l(c)15 was added by
Congress in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code.
The question of the scope of the applicability of this section is not new,
nor is it confined to the Jones Act. There are a number of general and
special venue statutes which provide for the bringing of suit in the district
in which the defendant resides. While the question of the applicability of
the section 139l(c) definition of corporate residence has not been litigated
with reference to all of them, the decisions in the cases where it has been
presented exhibit no major, all-encompassing trend. Rather, the holdings
seem to vary with the provision and with the court.16 The only Supreme
10 Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v.
Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496 (1894).
11 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 170 (1939).
12 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 11.
13 Since the defendants were not licensed to do business in Pennsylvania, the Neirbo
doctrine was not applicable to the principal case. Principal case at 592; see Robinson v.
Coos Bay Pulp Corp., 147 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1945).
14 This doctrine was held to extend to questions arising under the laws of the United
States, e.g., Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940), but
not to suits for patent infringement. American Chem. Paint Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 161
F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1947); Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co. v. Cole Elec. Prods. Co., 134 F.2d 545
(2d Cir. 1943). Some lower federal courts, however, would not find a waiver of venue by a
corporation which had not secured a license to do business within a state. Moss v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1945); Robinson v. Coos Bay Pulp Corp.,
supra note 13. Whether it extends to a cause of action arising outside of the state depends
on the state statute, North Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1942), and
on the construction given such statute by the state court, Sunshine v. Southland Cotton
Oil Co., 74 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. La. 1947).
15 28 U.S.C. § 139l(c) (1958).
16 As to the general venue provisions, § 139l(c) has been held to apply to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1393 (1958), which requires that suit be brought in the division in which the defendant
resides or, if there are multiple defendants, in the division in which any of them resides.
Reeder v. Corpus Christi Ref. Co., 111 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Tex. 1952); Pan Am. Airways,
Inc. v. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). It has been
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Court decision in this area is Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,17
which the court in the principal case relied upon unquestioningly as controlling. In the Fourco case the section 139l(c) definition of corporate
residence was held inapplicable in the determination of where a defendant
resides within the meaning of the special venue provision for patent infringement suits.1 8
The Fourco decision, however, need not necessarily be controlling in
a Jones Act case. The functions of these two special provisions are not the
same. In a patent infringement suit, the place where the defendant is
incorporated or in which he committed the acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business are manifestly the most convenient
places for trial. The defendant is there, the witnesses are likely to be there,
and the evidence will ordinarily be readily available. In a Jones Act case
the only one benefited by the restriction of venue to the state of incorporation or place of principal office is the defendant, and the benefit to the
defendant can consist only in the possible inconvenience to the plaintiff in
having to sue in one of these two places. In fact, the construction given the
Jones Act venue provision by the court in the principal case is likely to be
deleterious to trial convenience. A shipping corporation with offices in most
of the ports in which it does business does not necessarily have any greater
knowledge concerning the accident in the state of incorporation or at its
principal place of business than it has anywhere else. Depending on the
circumstances of the accident, defendant may well be in a better position to
defend in a district in which one of its other places of business is located.
By the time of trial, witnesses are as likely to be in some distant port or
aboard ship in the middle of an ocean as they are to be in the defendant's
state of incorporation or near its principal place of business. Other evidence,
too, may be anywhere in the world, leaving the parties in no better position
held to apply to 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1958), the provision for interpleader actions, Mosely v.
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., llO F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Mo. 1952), and to 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958),
providing for venue in stockholder's derivative suits, Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Section 139l(c) has been held inapplicable to antitrust suits under § 12 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677
(E.D. Pa. 1958). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1958), the general venue provision regarding
defendants residing in different districts of the same state, has been held supplementary to
the venue provisions of the antitrust laws. Anderson-Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary &:
Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). It is arguable that there ought to be a distinction in
the application of these two general venue provisions to antitrust actions because § 1392(a)
merely allows a defendant to be sued in a different district of the same state, whereas
§ 139l(c) may enable suit to be brought in a district far from that state, which may cast
a considerable burden on the defendant. However, in Phillips v. Pope &: Talbot, Inc.,
102 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), Judge Weinfeld observed that the import of his holding
in the Anderson-Friberg case was that the general venue provisions contained in §§ 1391-98
of the Judicial Code are supplementary to the venue provisions of the antitrust laws.
353 U.S. 222 (1957).
"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement
and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958).
17
18
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in one forum than another. Thus, while trial convenience is properly served
by the restriction of venue in patent infringement suits, the result is likely to
be just the opposite in Jones Act cases, and the possible inconvenience to
the plaintiff is contrary to the manifest purpose of the Jones Act, which
was to enlarge the rights and remedies of the seaman against his employer.1 9
The different histories of these two provisions also serve to point up
the difference in the judicial and legislative attitudes toward them. When
venue was restricted in 1887, the Supreme Court stated that the restriction
did not apply to actions for patent infringement.20 In response, Congress
enacted the law requiring that suits for patent infringement be brought in
the district where defendant was an inhabitant or had committed acts of
infringement and had a regular and established place of business.21 In 1942
the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a patent action could not be
sued in his joint defendant's district22 as provided by a general venue
statute,23 and in 1947 the Neirbo doctrine was held not to apply to suits for
patent infringement.24 When the Jones Act was passed, its venue provision
was more liberal than that of the general venue statute, and Congress made
no subsequent attempt to restrict it, as it had the patent infringement
venue provision. The courts exhibited a similar inclination toward more
liberal venue for Jones Act cases, as when the Neirbo doctrine was held
applicable to them,25 and when the rules of forum non conveniens and
transfer of venue26 were held to apply to cases arising under the Jones
Act.27 Thus, while the function of the patent infringement venue provision
has consistently been viewed as restrictive, confining the choice of forum
to those which are appropriate, the function of the Jones Act venue provision has been envisioned by both Congress and the courts as the enlargement of the choice of forums available to the injured seaman.
Viewing section 139l(c) as supplementary to the Jones Act would render
superfluous the phrase "principal place of business" in the same manner that
it would transform into surplusage the last clause of section 1400(b): "where
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business."28 This lends support to the conclusion
reached in the Fourco case, but is has no bearing on the principal case.
19 See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 6-1 to 6-4, at 248-51 (1957).
In re Keasby & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 230 (1895) (dictum); In re Hohorst, 150

20

U.S. 653 (1893) (alternative holding).
21 Judicial Code of 1911, § 48, 36 Stat. 1100.
22 Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
23 Judicial Code of 1911, § 52, 36 Stat. 1101.
American Chem. Paint Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 161 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1947).
25 Antonana v. Ore S.S. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Gibson v. United
States Lines, 74 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1947); Bennett v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 871
(D. Md. 1940).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
27 Le Mee v. Streckfus Steamers, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Mo. 1951); Mincy v. Detroit
& Cleveland Nav. Co., 96 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Bounds v. Streckfus Steamers, Inc.,
89 F. Supp. 242 (D. Del. 1950).
28 28 u.s.c. § 1400(b) (1958).

2,
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Section 1400(b) was undergoing revision and codification at the same time
as section 139l(c); the Jones Act was not. It is not to be assumed that
Congress would allow a meaningless phrase to remain in a statute being
revised concurrently with the one which renders it meaningless. However,
it is not uncommon for a later statute to affect the meaning of a prior one
without repealing part of it. If this were not the intent, a contrary purpose
would most likely be indicated, rather than left to inference.29 However,
there is no reference to venue under the Jones Act in the comprehensive
notes accompanying the revised Judicial Code. Similarly, the report of the
chief reviser of the Judicial Code,30 to which great weight was attached in
the Fourco case, does not bear on the principal case. In that report it was
stated that mere changes in phraseology did not indicate an intent to work
a change of meaning, but merely an effort to state the original meaning in
clear and simple terms, and that any change in meaning would be clearly
indicated in the reviser's notes appended to that section. From this the
Court concluded that since the reviser's notes to section 1400(b)31 indicated
that the changes therein were mere changes of phraseology, Congress did not
intend section 139l(c) to modify section 1400(b). However, it seems that
this report was given undue weight. Nowhere in it is the addition of
entirely new sections mentioned. Thus, while the report is pertinent to
the changes within section 1400(b) itself, it is not relevant to the question
of the application of section 139l(c) to section 1400(b), for section 139l(c)
was entirely new and had no reviser's notes appended to it. It follows a
fortiori that this report is totally irrelevant to the question of the application of section 139l(c) to the Jones Act, which was not even being revised
at that time.
The Fourco holding seems an inadequate basis for a decision involving
the general applicability of section 139l(c) to other special venue provisions. In Fourco the Court completely ignored what Congress may have
intended by adding section 139l(c), choosing instead to focus on what
Congress intended by changing section 1400(b). General application of
this holding to all special venue provisions may well thwart the legislative
intent indicated by the addition of section 139l(c). Thus, Fourco should be
viewed, not as having established a rule as to the general applicability of
section 139l(c) (a question not actually considered by the court), but as
having provided only a narrow rule regarding the applicability of section
139l(c) to a special venue provision which has a peculiar function and
history.
Viewing all of the foregoing considerations in the light of the protective
attitude long held toward seamen by the federal courts,32 the Supreme
Bagner v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 84 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
Barron, The Judicial Code 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 445·46 (1949).
"'Words in subsection (b) 'where defendant resides' were substituted for 'of which
defendant is an inhabitant.' . . . Words 'inhabitant' and 'resident' as respects venue are
synonymous." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Al31 (1947).
32 Seamen have been viewed as "poor and friendless and apt to acquire habits of
20
30
31
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Court's holding in the Fourco case does not make mandatory the conclusion
reached by the court in' the principal case. To the contrary, it is highly
probable that the Supreme Court would look with favor upon a construction
which would increase the availability of the Jones Act's benefits to the
seaman by giving him a choice of forums limited only by the business
activities of his employer.
Mary Mandana Long

gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. If some provision not be made for them
at the expense of the ship, they must suffer the accumulated evils of disease and poverty
and sometimes perish for want of suitable nourishment." Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas.
480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Mc. 1823) (Story, C.J.). Since Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S.
525 (1938), it has not been necessary for recovery that the seaman's illness or injury be
causally related to his shipboard duties, and in 1943 the owner of the ship was held
responsible for maintenance and cure for injuries incurred by the seaman while on shore
leave. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943). "The 'poor and friendless seaman'
is ••• the beneficiary of a system of accident and health insurance at the ship owners'
expense more comprehensive than anything yet achieved by shorebound workers."
GILMORE &: BLACK, op. cit. supra note 19, § 6-6, at 254. In order that he might realize his
liberal substantive benefits more fully, the seaman has enjoyed an increasing number of
procedural advantages, most of which have arisen because of the civil remedy for damages
granted by the Jones Act. The Supreme Court decided long ago that unseaworthiness and
Jones Act negligence were but two grounds of recovery arising from the same cause of
action and, although he may receive judgment on only one of them, he may plead both,
go to trial on both, and go to the jury on both, Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S.
316 (1927), and that a seaman's prior acceptance of maintenance and cure does not
preclude an action against his employer for damages under the Jones Act, Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928). A claim for maintenance and cure may be pleaded and
adjudicated with a related Jones Act claim in a civil action. Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959) (dictum). And, where a maintenance
and cure claim is joined with a Jones Act claim (both having arisen out of the same set
of facts), the seaman is entitled to a jury trial as of right on the maintenance and cure
claim even though the Jones Act claim be decided against him. Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).

